applying treaty provisions in order to resolve disputes arising from economic integration. 6 Even though the protection of human rights was not originally within their jurisdiction 7 through express or implied mandates, they have adjudicated over cases involving allegations of the violation of human rights.
Jurisdiction means the power or competence of a tribunal to adjudicate over a legal dispute, and issue a binding judgement. 8 The tribunals derive such power or competency from a constituent document that defines its power. 9 Where the instrument is silent about certain powers of the tribunal, the tribunal may decide to resort to an implied mandate in order to adjudicate over a legal issue before it. The tribunal can do so by considering whether the exercise of such power would be necessary to achieve its object and purpose as contained in the constituent document. 10 The primary focus of this discourse is the SADC Tribunal, which is the judicial organ of the SADC. It was established in terms of article 9(g) as read with article 16 of the SADC Treaty. The Tribunal's mandate inter alia is to ensure adherence to and proper interpretation of the provisions of the SADC Treaty and its subsidiary instruments, and to adjudicate over the disputes that may be referred to it. 11 The decisions of the SADC Tribunal are final and binding on the parties to the dispute. 12 The SADC Tribunal did not have the power to compel SADC member states to comply with its decisions. Instead, in cases of non-compliance, it had to determine if there had indeed been a failure on the part of member state to comply with its ruling. If this was so, it had to refer such a case to the Summit for the latter to take appropriate action. 13 The SADC Tribunal became operational on 22 November 2006. However, the challenges against the legitimacy and the extent of the powers conferred upon Ltd v Republic of Zimbabwe. 15 In this case the SADC Tribunal, through the exercise of implied powers, ruled that it had powers and competency to adjudicate over a case concerning the allegations of human rights violations. 16 This study investigates whether the attacks on the SADC Tribunal, as an international organisation, were legally warranted and whether the Tribunal acted within its powers when it accepted and adjudicated on a case involving human rights abuses.
For the purposes of a comprehensive analysis of the delimitation of the jurisdiction of international tribunals, this paper is composed of five sections. Section I deals with the powers of international organisations as conferred on them by member states and the exercise of the implied powers that are necessary for the organisation to fulfil its objectives. Section II discusses the implied powers of international organisations under international law with specific reference to the decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Section III focuses on the exercise of implied powers to adjudicate over human rights cases by the EACJ and the ECOWAS CCJ. Section IV discusses the exercise of implied powers by the SADC Tribunal in the Campbell case and compares it with the decisions of the ECOWAS CCJ, the EACJ and the ICJ.
Section V provides a conclusion and recommendations.
Jurisdiction of international organisations
The constitution or treaty establishing an international organisation indicates the powers that that organisation possesses and the extent to which those powers are to be performed. 17 However, it is not always the case that the constituent document is precise regarding the powers that an organisation possesses or must have. This happens, for example, where the constituent document is silent or ambiguous on jurisdictional aspects.
With specific reference to the SADC Tribunal, the powers that were given to and/or exercised by the SADC Tribunal were mainly conferred on it by member states through the SADC Treaty and the Protocol on the Tribunal and Rules thereof (SADC Protocol on the Tribunal). 18 The SADC Protocol was silent on whether or not the SADC Tribunal had jurisdiction over human rights cases. This therefore requires a detailed discussion of the doctrine of the express and implied powers of international organisations.
Express powers
Express powers are those powers that are explicitly conferred upon an organisation by state parties. They indicate the nature and the extent to which the powers must be exercised. 19 According to the doctrine of express powers, an organisation may exercise only the powers that are given to it by member states through a constituent document. 20 In this regard, the SADC Tribunal's jurisdiction is provided for in article 14 of the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal, which indicates that the Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over all disputes that relate inter alia to the interpretation and application of the SADC Treaty. The proponents of expressed powers argue that the SADC anything outside that would be beyond its mandate. 21 In light of the failure of the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal to refer emphatically to the competency to deal with human rights cases, the question posed by Campbell is relevant: "if an express power is given does the definition of that power mean that you cannot exercise another similar power which is not expressed?" 22 The question arises because what is clearly set out in the SADC Treaty and the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal is the fact that specific reference is made to the "observance of human rights and the rule of law" in the Preamble. Furthermore, the SADC Treaty also requires member states to act in accordance with the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law. 23 Given this, the question to ask is whether the principles and aspirations that are contained in the SADC Treaty impose obligations on member states to respect human rights in their respective territories. Alternatively, does the mere reference to human rights in the SADC Treaty empower the SADC Tribunal, through implied powers, to adjudicate over cases of human rights? These are some of the key questions that will be addressed in this discourse.
Implied powers
Implied powers are those powers which, while not explicitly stated, seem to be implied by the express powers in a constituent document. 24 power reasonably necessary to attain it". 29 Support for the contention that implied powers may legitimately be exercised is based on the fact that the application of another power is for the purposes of complementing an already existing power, function or objective. It can therefore be said that belief in the doctrine of implied powers denotes that the tribunal could exercise certain powers even though such powers are not contained in its founding document. 30 Implied powers are deemed to be conferred on the organisation only if they are essential for the performance of explicit powers and functions. 31 This is an exception to the doctrine of express powers which requires that only those powers that are set forth in the constituent document should be exercised. 32 The doctrines of implied and express powers appear to be competing against each other, because the former involves the protection of community interest 33 while the latter seems to be protective of state sovereignty, because it requires the organisation to act within the mandate that was given to it by member states. 34 It is submitted that these doctrines should not be seen as being in conflict with each other but as supplementing each other, as implied powers come into play only when express powers do not provide an answer to a particular question.
The resort to the exercise of implied powers by international organisations is not without constraints. The test applied to ascertain whether or not an international organisation has implied powers is whether the exercise of an implied power is necessary for the organisation to achieve its object and purpose as specified in the constituent treaty. 35 If the answer is no, then an organisation would have acted beyond its mandate and the exercise of such a power would be ultra vires. The paper now discusses the decisions of international tribunals that have involved the exercise of implied powers. In this case, a number of people had died while they were in the service of the United Nations. 37 Following their deaths, the General Assembly requested an advisory opinion from the ICJ on whether the United Nations had the capacity to bring an international claim against the responsible government for the people who had died while in the service of the United Nations. This was made with a view to obtaining the reparations due in respect of the damage caused to the victims, or the persons entitled to such reparation through the victim. 38 The court first indicated that the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) "does not expressly confer upon the Organisation the capacity to include, in its claim for reparation, damage caused to the victim or to persons entitled through him". 39 It then asked whether or not:
… the provisions of the Charter concerning the functions of the Organisation, and the part played by its agents in the performance of those functions, imply for the Organisation power to afford its agents the limited protection that would consist in the bringing of a claim on their behalf for reparation for damage suffered in such circumstances.
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The court answered the aforesaid question in the affirmative. It said that under international law, an organisation must be construed as being given implied powers which are necessary for discharging its duties even if such powers are not expressly provided for in the constituent document. 41 necessary in order for it to be able to achieve its object and purposes as provided for in the founding document. 49 The court's approach is acceptable, and it is argued that it is in line with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).
These require that a treaty be interpreted with reference inter alia to its objectives and purposes. 50 In addition, the Vienna Convention requires the preamble to any treaty to also be considered during the process of interpretation, so that the document is considered as a whole, in order to avoid interpreting certain provisions The accused filed a preliminary motion challenging the jurisdiction of the tribunal on the basis that it lacked the power and the competency to try him. 56 Yugoslavia. 60 The court therefore dismissed the accused's preliminary motion that challenged the jurisdiction of the ICTY. The approach adopted by the court in this matter is commendable as it adopted a flexible approach in interpreting article 41 of the UN Charter to also include powers of the Security Council to create a tribunal.
Indeed, the measures listed under article 41 of the UN Charter do not constitute a closed list, as the words "may include" imply that other measures that are not listed in the provision may also be explored. It is submitted that had the ICTY adopted a rigid approach in interpreting the provisions of the UN Charter, this would have denied the Security Council an opportunity to deal with something that was well within its powers -namely, to restore peace. In light of the above exposition, it is evident that international tribunals have not been hesitant to invoke and apply the doctrine of implied powers in order to give an organization the power necessary to achieve its objectives and purposes as contained in its constituent document.
Jurisdiction of sub-regional courts over human rights in Africa
The ECOWAS CCJ, the EACJ and the SADC Tribunal have also been confronted with cases that required the exercise of implied powers. This is because the constituent documents of the aforesaid organisations were silent or not clear with regard to the ability of the tribunals to adjudicate over cases involving allegations of human rights violations. This part deals with the manner in which each tribunal exercised jurisdiction over human rights when the founding treaty was not clear or silent on the competency of the tribunal in that regard.
The East African Court of Justice
The EACJ is the judicial organ of the EAC. See a 9 of the Treaty Establishing the East African Community (1999) .
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A 9 of the Treaty Establishing the East African Community (1999) .
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In 2005, a draft protocol was created that was intended to expand the jurisdiction of the court to cater for human rights cases, but to date nothing has been finalised. See Mwinuka Regional Human Right Systems 7. been arrested and remanded in custody. 65 The High Court of Uganda had subsequently granted bail to some of the accused. Soon after their release, the court had been surrounded by security personnel who re-arrested the accused. The applicants had then been prosecuted before a military court for similar charges. 66
They had been remanded in prison. The Uganda Law Society had approached the Constitutional Court of Uganda and challenged the constitutionality of the prosecution. 67 The Constitutional Court had declared the detentions unconstitutional and had ordered that the accused persons be released. The Government of Uganda had failed to honour the court order, and the matter was brought before the EACJ. 68
In the EACJ, the applicants argued that the military charges, continued detention, and failure to observe a court order violated articles 6(d), 7(2) and 8 (1) rights. 70 The basis for this was that the Council had not yet adopted the protocol that would have extended the court's power to adjudicate over human rights cases. 71 The court agreed with Counsel to the effect that it had no jurisdiction over human rights cases as there was no protocol that has been adopted to operationalise its human rights mandate. 72 It nonetheless said that:
[w]hile the court will not assume jurisdiction to adjudicate on human rights disputes, it will not abdicate from exercising its jurisdiction of interpretation under Article 27(1) merely because the reference includes allegation of human rights violation.
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Therefore, the EACJ assumed jurisdiction and concluded that the intervention by the armed security agents of Uganda to prevent the execution of a court order violated wherein the applicants approached the SADC Tribunal for a declaratory order indicating that the respondent had failed to comply with decisions of the SADC. The domestic court of the respondent had refused to register and enforce the decision of the Tribunal. In addition, the respondent had sent a letter to the SADC Tribunal informing it that it would not subject itself to the court's jurisdiction and that all the previous decisions made by the SADC Tribunal against Zimbabwe were null and void. On this basis the Court established a breach of compliance. The SADC Tribunal found that the respondent had failed to comply with its decisions and made a decision to report the respondent to the Summit. Hulse and Van der Vleuten "Agent Run Amuck" 96. 113 Hulse and Van der Vleuten "Agent Run Amuck" 96. support of the Summit decision because it was facing a commercial case that would have had potentially far reaching cost implications against the country. 114
In the light of the above exposition, it is pertinent to state that solidarity triumphed over the rule of law, as the Campbell decision and other factors ultimately resulted in the suspension of the SADC Tribunal, which was viewed as having exceeded its mandate or as a threat to state sovereignty. 115 Zenda, 116 for example, is also concerned about what he refers to as the "casual reference" by the SADC Tribunal to concepts such as democracy, the rule of law and human rights, because there are no precise meanings of the aforesaid terms.
According to him the word "democracy" is a broad political concept that was illsuited to be brought before the SADC Tribunal. 117 As for the concept of "human rights", he states that it is not clear about which rights are referred to, because some states are more concerned with economic rights than social and cultural rights. 118 He is of the view that the SADC Tribunal was incorrect to rely on article includes the observance of democratic principles such as human rights. 121 As for the term "human rights" in respect of which he remarks that there is insufficient precision as to which rights are to be protected, this observation is untenable.
Human rights include civil, economic, political and social and cultural rights. All of these rights require protection, and no rights should be regarded as being more demanding or important than other rights. 122 In the light of the above exposition, I
am unable to agree with Zenda's attacks on the reasoning of the SADC Tribunal. It is therefore submitted that it was within the SADC Tribunal's power to grant itself the competency to deal with human rights cases by interpreting article 4(c) of the SADC Treaty as obliging Member States to act in accordance with the principles of human rights, democracy and the rule of law.
There is a possibility that the omission of the express mandate over human rights was a diplomatic omission. This conjecture is supported by the fact that there were unsuccessful attempts to grant the SADC Tribunal express mandate over human rights in 1997. 123 Some authors are of the view that the said proposals were not a huge concern at the time, as the SADC Treaty already made reference to human rights, 124 and to this end human rights already fell within the SADC Tribunal's mandate through implication. 125 Indeed, it is unthinkable that SADC Member States would be able to realise the principles that are set out in the SADC Treaty, such as acting in accordance with the principles of human rights and the rule of law, and the duty to refrain from taking any measures that are likely to compromise the accomplishment of the said standards, if those principles were ignored. 126 Other authors are of the view that even though RECs were created mainly to deal with economic issues as opposed to the protection of human rights, there is a link between the motives for their objectives of regional integration, such as improving the welfare of the people, and the realisation of socio-economic rights. 127 To provide clarity surrounding the Tribunal's human rights jurisdiction, the SADC Summit appointed a consultant to study the human rights jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal, amongst other factors, and to provide answers. 130 The study revealed that under international law, principles refer to binding obligations. 131 Bartles further highlighted the fact that "[t]he verbal phrase shall act in article 4(c) of the SADC Treaty is in the usual language of obligations, and the object of the sentence in accordance with the following principles …') is clearly defined". 132 As a result, these constitute binding obligations and therefore the SADC Tribunal was well vested to deal with human rights. 133 The consultant therefore found that the SADC Tribunal correctly dealt with a human rights case and found no basis for the suspension of the Tribunal. The aforesaid recommendations were unfortunately ignored by the SADC Summit. This is a major concern and a blow to the SADC region as the SADC Tribunal was the only court at a sub-regional level to deal with human rights cases. bringing human rights cases within its jurisdiction and is not afraid to declare violations of the same. 139 It is submitted that the ECOWAS CCJ adopted a narrow interpretation of the instruments establishing the ECOWAS CCJ by relying on the doctrine of express powers. Article 4(c) of the Revised Treaty of Community of West African States inter alia provides for the "recognition, promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights in accordance with the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights". Therefore, it is submitted, by implication the aforesaid provision empowers the ECOWAS CCJ to adjudicate over human rights matters, and recently it has not hesitated to do so.
What have the ICJ, SADC Tribunal, ECOWAS CCJ, ICTY and the EACJ taught us on implied powers
International courts such as the ICJ have laid down a foundation of practice supporting the contention that implied powers should be exercised as long as they are necessary for the fulfilment of the organisations' objectives. Furthermore, they should be exercised if there is nothing prohibiting their use in the constituent document. Even though the exercise of implied powers was developed by domestic courts, they have received support from other major international tribunals such as the ICTY, which also resorted to the doctrine of implied powers in the Tadić case.
Sub-regional courts such as the EACJ and the SADC Tribunal also seized the opportunity to exercise implied powers in order to protect and promote human rights. Unfortunately, the ECOWAS CCJ then failed to utilise an opportunity that was well within its implied powers to protect human rights when it opted not to adjudicate over a human rights case. Fortunately, this position no longer prevails as the ECOWAS CCJ has more recently adjudicated cases involving allegations of human rights violations. 140 In the light of the above exposition, it is submitted that the SADC Tribunal acted correctly when it resorted to implied powers to interpret and apply the provisions of the SADC Treaty to protect human rights. Further, the discussion of other tribunals has indicated that the courts do resort to implied powers in order to achieve their objectives when their constituent document is silent.
It is therefore submitted that implied powers should be used where necessary in order to allow judicial organs to fulfil their mandate. An organisation that exercises implied powers should elaborate on what led it to act in terms of such powers, especially in cases involving the allegation of human rights violations and the interpretation of the treaty that is said to be protecting human rights.
It must nonetheless be conceded that implied powers do not provide the maximum protection of human rights, as litigants have the sympathy of the courts in individual matters only. It is in this regard that Murungi and Gallinetti have expressed the view that even though the exercise of implied powers does not prevent the exercise of jurisdiction, a tribunal could be seen as exceeding the mandate originally given to it, thus inviting parties to challenge its jurisdiction and delay the proceedings. 141 This observation has merit, because the decision of the SADC Tribunal in the Campbell case was challenged on the basis that the tribunal had no jurisdiction over human rights. However, this should not be an excuse because there may be new factors that may arise in future which were not foreseen or present when the treaty was negotiated and concluded, and it would not be appropriate to refer a treaty back to member states for deliberations and clarity on a particular aspect, as that would presumably deny justice to those whose human rights are under attack.
In the light of the above exposition, it may be concluded that the approach taken by the SADC Tribunal was in line with the provisions of the Vienna Convention, which requires inter alia that a treaty be interpreted in good faith and that words be given their ordinary meaning with reference to the objectives and purposes of the convention. 142 Further, the Vienna Convention requires the preamble of the treaty to be considered during the process of interpretation. In other words, a convention should not be selectively interpreted but it should be read as a whole. roles. 144 The motives and aims contained in the preamble can be used to assist the reader to understand and interpret provisions set forth in the operative part of the treaty. 145 The preamble can also inter alia "contain supplementary provisions intended to fill the gaps in the treaty by recalling the general principles of law that inspired the treaty". 146 In some instances, the obligations of member states can also be set out in the preamble. 147 It was therefore within the powers of the SADC Tribunal to use the preamble to the SADC Treaty to search for answers on whether or not it had competency to adjudicate over human rights cases. The actions of an organisation that can be shown to be necessary for the fulfilment of its objectives and purposes are within the competence of that tribunal, as long as they are not expressly excluded. 148
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Conclusion and recommendations
The foregoing discussion has revealed that there is seemingly a conflict between the doctrine of express and implied powers. The former requires tribunals not to resort to the application of anything other than what is contained in the constituent document. The latter enables a tribunal to go outside of the express powers as long as doing so would be necessary for the tribunal to fulfil its object and purpose as set out in the founding document. This is, provided that there is nothing prohibiting the exercise of the implied powers. But it is submitted that the doctrines of express and implied powers should not be viewed as competing against each other. Instead, the two should be seen as supplementing each other, because implied powers are resorted to only when express powers are silent (and thus do not prohibit the exercise of a further power The SADC Tribunal did not do anything that was prohibited by the SADC Treaty.
Inter alia it utilised the preambl, as an interpretative and supplementary tool to invoke implied powers in order to assert jurisdiction over a human rights case. The doctrine of implied powers is well known under international law and other tribunals have also used it where they deemed it necessary to achieve their objectives and purposes as contained in the constituent document. It is unfortunate that the SADC Tribunal was regarded as having acted beyond its mandate when it resorted to implied powers. It is submitted that the continued suspension of the SADC Tribunal is unwarranted because it did nothing wrong when it invoked implied powers to za. This paper is based on research conducted for my LLD studies entitled "The SADC Tribunal: Its Jurisdiction, the Enforcement of its Judgments and the Sovereignty of its Member States". My heartfelt appreciation goes to my two year-old daughter, Tshiamo Lusseka Refilwe Phooko, who may not understand and/or appreciate the importance of this work within the SADC region because of her young age. I hope that one day she will understand why I spent a lot of time in the study room at home working on this paper and my LLD studies while at the same time accommodating her whenever she asked to help me by typing. Thanks are also due to my colleagues, Mzukisi Njotini and Lee Stone, for their valuable comments on an earlier draft of this work. All the views and errors are mine. 
